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A Closer Look At "Right to Work"
Legislation
By Edwin R. Teple
THERE HAS been much concern of late with the right to work.
References to this right, however, go well back into our history, and with-
in more recent memory it has been mentioned as one of the things the
free world was fighting for during the last great war. As one aspect of
the freedom of the individual, it is likely to have many applications.1 At
the outset, therefore, it should be explained that this paper is concerned
solely with a limited aspect of the subject - governmental regulation of
compulsory unionism. The
THE AUTHoR (A.B., 1933 Ohio Northern Uni- so-called "right to work"
versity; J.D., 1936 Ohio State) is a practicing laws,2 to which most of
attorney in Cleveland and Willoughby, Ohio. the recent interest has
He is also an instructor in Labor aw at West- been confined, are simply
ern Reserve Law School. provisions designed to out-
law efforts to make union
membership a condition of getting or holding a job.3 It is possible, at
'There is no express reference to such a right in the United States Constitution, al-
though occasionally writers speak of it as though there had been. See, McClain,
The Union Shop Amendment: Compulsory "Freedom" To Join a Union, 42 A.B.AJ.
723 (1956).
The right to work has been referred to as one of the aspects of "liberty," within
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, and has been mentioned in con-
nection with the "equal protection" clause of the First Amendment. These refer-
ences have been made in connection with such subjects as monopoly, Butchers' Union
Company v. Crescent City Company, 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884); limitations upon
the employment of aliens, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915); state control
of the manufacture of oleomargarine, Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684
(1888); and the right of Chinese laundrymen to pursue their business in the city
of San Francisco, Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Another contemporary author has pointed out that the only major world power
which explicitly mentions the "right to work" in its constitution is the Soviet Union.
Gilbert, The Right to Work Revisited: A Reply to Dean Joseph A. McCai-n, 43
A.B.AJ. 231, 286 (1957).
References to the right to work are much like those frequently made to the right
of association, which is also discussed at some length by J. A. McClain, Jr. in his
article, supra. Actually, there is no express reference to such a right in the con-
stitution either, it usually being assumed that this is inherent in the right "peace-
ably to assemble." For an analysis of the right of association, see Wyzansky, The
Open Window and the Open Door: An Inquiry Into Freedom of Association, 35
CALIF. L. REV. 336 (1947).
No hint of constitutional origin is contained in the so-called "right to work"
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this time, to examine some of the applications and interpretations of
these provisions.
THE HISTORY OF UNION SECURITY
In order to better understand this counter-revolution, and its implica-
tions, a brief discussion of the object of the attack should be of assistance.
Compulsory unionism refers to practices designed to achieve "union
laws themselves. For instance, 2C N.C. GEN. STAT. 95-78, (1950), contains the fol-
lowing:
"The right to live includes the right to work. The exercise of the right
to work must be protected and maintained free from undue restraints and
coercion. It is hereby declared to be the public policy of North Carolina
that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on ac-
count of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor or-
ganization or association."
2Of the 19 states which now have "right to work" provisions, either in statutory
or constitutional form, 11 are in the South, in a solid line from Virginia to Texas.
All but one of the remainder are non-industrial states in the west. This particular
type of provision originated in the state of Florida in 1944.
It is well known that the National Association of Manufacturers and the United
States Chamber of Commerce have been actively supporting "right to work" legis-
lation, but it is reported that very few of the large corporations have taken a posi-
tion one way or the other. Fortune, Sept. 1957, p. 236. According to this report,
lobbying in state legislatures for these laws is chiefly being pushed by small busi-
ness and farm organizations, particularly the American Farm Bureau Federation.
'The labor movement is constantly seeking to expand its membership and influence,
partly as a means of self protection. By opposing legislations of this type, with this
name attached, the unions have been placed, in the minds of some, in a position of
opposing this time honored "right."
Lest anyone be led to ascribe nothing but selfish or improper motives to or-
ganized labor in general, it should be pointed out that the social insurance programs,
such as old age and survivor's insurance, workmen's compensation, unemployment
insurance and the like, invariably have the unions among their strongest and most
outspoken advocates, notwithstanding the fact that such programs apply with equal
force to all working people and their families, without regard to membership in the
union. The same may be said -for legislation in the areas of fair employment
practices, child labor, fair labor standards, factory inspection, public assistance,
public housing and the like, all of which directly affect the welfare of the individual.
Without rancor, it may be noted that the same can hardly be said of many of the
opponents of compulsory unionism.
The history of the labor movement is well known and certainly may be said to
have achieved respectability under modern law. See, Tobriner, The Labor Union:
Public Utility of Labor Relations, 43 A.B.A.J. 805 (1957). Basically, it is an
effort on the part of working people, by joining together, to advance their interests
and to secure the rights to which they feel they are entitled. As the United States
Supreme Court said in Railway Employees' Department, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S.
225 (1956), "One would have to be blind to history to assert that trade unionism
did not enhance and strengthen the right to work."
It is well known, of course, that one of the primary concerns of most unions is the
rate to be paid for work performed. That this is a very pertinent phase of the
subject will become apparent upon reflection, since the right to work would be
rather hollow if no pay, or an inadequate return, were forthcoming.
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security." Included within this term are the provisions frequently in-
corporated in collective bargaining agreements which have as their object
the strengthening of the union's position with respect to (a) employers,
(b) other unions, and (c) workers without union affiliation. The most
common provisions of this type are: (1) the dosed shop,4 (2) the un-
ion shop,5 (3) the preferential shop,6 and (4) maintenance of member-
ship.7
The history of this aspect of the American labor movement, which
seems to have no counterpart as an issue in other countries,8 goes back
to the early part of the last century.9 At first the courts refused to give
legal sanction to union security provisions. Typical of the early common
law was the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Berry v. Donovanz, ° in which a shoemaker, who had refused to join the
union, brought an action for damages for malicious interference with his
contract of employment. The court held that the plaintiff had a primary
right to be undisturbed in the benefit and performance of his contract of
employment, and that the intentional interference with such right without
lawful justification was malicious in law, even though the motives for
such interference were understandable and without express malice. In
matters of this kind, the court said, the law does not tolerate monopolies
and the attempt to force all laborers to combine in unions is against the
policy of the law. However, most of the early decisions in this mold have
'The employer contracts not to hire anyone except members of the particular union,
and to discharge any employee who does not remain a union member in good stand-
ing throughout the life of the agreement. Most of these provisions require the em-
ployer to hire through the union unless suitable workmen cannot be furnished in
this manner within a specified period, in which case the worker hired elsewhere must
join the union before starting to work.
'Under this type of provision, the employer may hire workers on the open market
but all new employees must join the union within a specified period, frequently 30
days, and must continue their membership in good standing throughout the life
of the agreement.
'Preference is to be given to union members in hiring workers. The employer is
free to hire workers on the open market only if the union fails to supply suitable
workers within a specified period.
Under this type of provision, membership in the union is not required of new
employees; they may join or not, as they prefer. Once they do join, however, they
must maintain their union membership in good standing for the life of the agree-
ment, although occasionally an "escape clause" is included which permits with-
drawal at certain specified times.
'Although the union shop has been tacitly accepted by European employers and has
been traditional with European workers as far back as the early Guilds, the issue
has not been an important one. MATHEWS, LABOR RELATiONS AND THE LAW
449 (1953).
9Id. at 449-452.
10188 Mass. 353, 74 NE. 603 (1905).
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since been overruled, and the modern judicial view has been that such
provisions are enforceable. 1
In the original National Labor Relations Act, Congress recognized
and approved union security provisions at least in principle.1 2  This pol-
icy was partially changed, however, amid much furor and public debate,
by the enactment in 1947 of extensive amendments, popularly known as
the Taft-Hartley Act. Under the present language of the law, now known
as the Labor Management Relations Act, the dosed shop has, in effect,
been outlawed; but the union shop and lesser forms of union security
were permitted to remain.18
The history of union security provisions under the Railway Labor Act
is somewhat in reverse. Such provisions were expressly forbidden by the
1934 amendments to that Act.14 In 1951, however, the Act was further
amended to permit the inclusion of union shop and check-off provisions
in collective bargaining agreements thereunder.' 5
STATE LEGISLATION BANNING UNION SECURITY PROVISIONS
It was Section 14 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act which opened the door
to the enactment of the state "right to work" laws.16 By this means the
subject of compulsory unionism became one which the states may regu-
late concurrently with the Federal government, notwithstanding the fact
't See, for instance, Hamer v. Nashawena Mills, Inc., 315 Mass. 160, 52 N.E. 2d 22,
(1943), in which the court said: "The validity of a closed shop agreement, if freely
and voluntarily made primarily for the mutual advantage of the parties, has always
been upheld and enforced even if the opportunity for securing employment by other
workmen, not members of the contracting union may thereby be greatly restricted
or practically destroyed. Such an agreement has been recognized as a legitimate
means which a labor union may employ to secure for its members all the work of
their employers that they are competent to perform." Notwithstanding this recog-
nition, some courts still hold that concerted activity to obtain such a provision is
illegal and can be enjoined. See, Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 48
N.E. 2d 1 (1943).
"See § 8 (3) of the Wagner Act as enacted in 1935, 49 STAr. 449 (1935).
'The sections involved are 8 (a) (3), 8 (b) (1) proviso, 8 (b) (2) and 9 (e),
61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C., §§ 158, 159 (1953).
14At the request of the unions themselves, apparently because of their fears that
company-dominated oragnizations would threaten the existence of independent,
bona fide unions. See, MATHEwS, LABOR RELATiONS AND THE LAw, 475 (1953);
Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line, 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E. 2d (1955).
64 STAT. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1953).
1
'The language of the Section is as follows: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed
as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment in any state or territory in which
such execution or application is prohibited by state or territorial law." 61 STAT.
151 (1947), 29 U.S.C., § 164 (b) (1952).
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that such regulations may affect interstate commerce or may limit unions
more drastically than the Federal law.17
Since the enactment of Section 14 (b), 18 states have adopted pro-
visions outlawing some or all of the union security provisions in collec-
tive bargaining agreements, by constitutional amendment, or statute, or a
combination of the two.'8
The objectives of those who have supported legislation of this type
have been the subject of some rather interesting speculation. 19 A recent
survey, however, tends to indicate that the results have been somewhat
less than earth shaking.P In at least one state, the desired result seems
17HR REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1947); HR REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1947).
'9AI.A. CODE, tit. 26 §§ 375 (1) to 375 (7) (1940); ARIZ. CoNsT., art. II § 35
and ARM CODE, §§ 56-1301 to 56-1308 (1956); ARK. CoNsT., amend XXXIV and
ARK. STAT., §§ 81-201 to 81-205 (1947); GA. CODE, §§ 54-901 to 908, and 9922
(1935); Ind. Laws of 1957, digested at Par. 41,025, CCH LAB. L. REP. (1957);
IOWA CODE, § 736 A.1 to .8 (1949); LA. REv. STAT., §§ I to 12, since repealed,
effective 20 days after the 1956 regular session of the General Assembly, leaving only
a limited statute applying to agricultural workers (CCH LAB. L. REP. Weekly
Summary No. 413, 6/28/56); Mss. CODE, §§ 6984.5 (a) to (h) (1942); NEB.
CONST., art. 15, §§ 13 to 15 and NEB. REV. STAT., §§ 48-217, to 48-219 (1943);
NEv. Comp. LAWS, § 10473 (1949); N.C. GEN. STAT., Div. XIII, c. 95, §§ 95-78 to
95-84 (1950); N.D. REV. CODE, § 34-0114 (1943); S.C. CODE, tit 40, §§ 40-46
to 40-46.11 (1952); S.D. CONST. art VI, § 2, 2nd S.D. Laws 1947 c. 92; TENN.
CODE, §§ 50-208 to 50-212 (1955); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5207 (a), §§ I to
5 (1948); UTAH CODE, §§ 1 to 18 (1953); VA. CODE, §§ 40-68 to 40-74.5
(1950).
Florida amended its constitution in 1944 to insert a provision of this type in
Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights, and thus preceded the enactment of Sec-
tion 14 (b) of the L.M.R.A. At the present writing, therefore, there are 19 states
with some provision of this particular type.
A proposed law of this type was placed on the ballot in the state of Washington
last Fall (1956) and was defeated. At the same time, Nevada voters were given
an opportunity to repeal their law and declined to do so. CCH LAB. L. REP.,
Weekly Summary No. 443, 11/15/56.
For the one state (Indiana) which enacted such a law this year, twelve others in
legislative session took no action on bills which were introduced. In Idaho, it is
reported that the issue was closely contested, but in states like California, Connecti-
cut, Illinois, and Ohio, no real threat developed. Fortune, Sept., 1957, at p. 241.
" It has been suggested that the southern states originally abolished compulsory
unionism as an inducement to northern industry to relocate, thus making it basically
an economic move. Cheit, Union Security and the Right to Work, 6 LAB. L. J. 357
(1955). The unions, of course, consider it an effort to cripple the labor move-
ment.
I" Fortune, Sept., 1957, at p. 236. According to this report, very little union bust-
ing has occurred, although in some states the laws have made it somewhat more
difficult to organize workers inclined to be on the fence. In one state, where the
law succeeded in attracting new industry, union membership actually increased, ap-
patently following the industry in; while in the others, union membership appears
to be about as high as before. It is also reported that enforcement has not been
effective and union security provisions still exist in many of these states.
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to have been obtained without the benefit of special legislation,2 ' but leg-
islative action was already underway and is now in effect.
The statutory method, as a rule, first declares that it is contrary to
state policy to deny or abridge the right of a person to work on account
of membership or non-membership in a labor union (this is the extent
of most of the constitutional provisions); prohibits any requirement mak-
ing membership or non-membership in a labor union, or the payment of
dues, fees, or any other charges thereto, a condition of employment; states
that any agreement or combination accomplishing such a result is against
public policy and amounts to an illegal combination or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade; and provides for the recovery of damages for any viola-
tion thereof.2 Virginia has one of the most detailed acts, and Georgia
one of the toughest.23
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "RIGHT TO WoRK" LAWS
The constitutionality of these provisions has been established beyond
any question. The United States Supreme Court has specifically upheld,
as against constitutional attack, the provisions of the North Carolina
statute24 and the Nebraska constitutional amendment.25 In a companion
case, the Arizona right to work amendment, providing that no person
shall be denied the opportunity to obtain or retain employment because
of non-membership in a labor organization, and nothing more, was also
upheld as a constitutional exercise of state power to protect the public
welfare.
26
'In Snavely v. International Harvester Co., (Ind. Cir. 1947), 39 L.R.R.M. 2526,
the court held that Indiana policy forbids contracts requiring maintenance of union
membership as a condition of employment. Ironically, the decision appears to rest
rather heavily upon a single clause in the introductory language of the state Anti-
Injunction Act, which states that "the individual unorganized-worker is commonly
helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract, and to protect his freedom of labor,
and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore,
though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that
he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his em-
ployment .... (Emphasis supplied). Ind. Acts 1933, c 12, §§ 40-502.
See, for instance, the Alabama and North Carolina statutes, note 18 supra, which
appear to be typical.
The penality prescribed in Section 9922 of the Georgia Act for violation of these
provisions, places it within the discretion of the Judge to impose any one or more
of the following: a $1,000 fine, imprisonment up to six months in the chain gang,
or up to 12 months on any other public works; except that a female, in lieu of the
chain gang, may be sentenced for up to 12 months to labor and confinement.
"Whitaker v. North Carolina, 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
'Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1949).
'AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949). A separate opinion
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In the first two cases, the Supreme Court ruled that nothing in the
language of these provisions indicated a purpose to prohibit the exercise
of either free speech or the right of assembly and petition. With respect
to the issue of equal protection of the laws, the Court found that the pro-
visions in question commanded equal employment opportunities for both
groups of workers, i.e., union members as well as non-members. Further-
more, the Court said, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not forbid legislative safeguards for the opportunity of non-
union workers to get and retain jobs. In the words of the Court: "Just
as we have held that the due process clause erects no obstacle to block
legislative protection of union members, we now hold that legislative
protection can be afforded non-union workers."
With respect to the Arizona constitutional amendment, the Court re-
peated the rule of the Jones & Laughlin case2 7 that "legislative authority
exerted within its proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its
reach." Otherwise, the issues were disposed of in the same manner as in
the other two cases. The state and lower Federal courts have uniformly
held similar views.28
The Louisiana law, before its repeal, attempted to extend the prohi-
bitions even further by banning picketing, work stoppages and other
conduct "a purpose or effect of which" was to cause someone to violate
the Act. This was held to be an unconstitutional infringement of free
speech to the extent that it authorized interference with picketing which
might have such an "effect" without an unlawful purpose. The saving
clause at the end of the statute, however, prevented this defect from in-
validating the remainder of the provisions29
It may also be of interest to note that statutes barring union security
provisions will not be applied to collective bargaining agreements made
before such prohibitions became effective.30
was necessary because of the omission of any protection for union members and
the additional issue thereby raised.
-NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 S.E. 2d 872 (1949); Construction and Gen-
eral Labor Union v. Stephenson, 148 Tex. 434, 225 S.W. 2d (1950); Local 519.
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry v. Robertson, 44 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950);
Piegts v. Meat Cutters' Union, 228 La. 131, 81 So. 2d 835 (1955); AFL v. Watson,
60 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Fla. 1945); Federal Firefighters v. Roane-Anderson Co.,
185 Tenn. 320, 206 S.W. 2d 369 (1947); Maccari v. International Teamsters
Union, 187 Tenn. 345, 215 S.W. 2d 779 (1948).
'Hanson v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 79 So. 2d 199 (La. Cir.
Ct. App. 1955).
'Head v. Barber's Union, 35 LR RM. 2533 (Ala. 1955); see, also, the recent rul-
ing of the Indiana Commissioner of Labor, CCH IAB. L. REP., (Ind.) Par. 41,025
(1957).
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QUESTION OF PROPER PARTY PLAINTIFF
Several jurisdictions have considered the matter of who may enlist the
aid of the courts in the enforcement of these provisions. There can be
no doubt about the right of the individual workman to bring civil suit
under those statutes which specifically provide for damages. The state
itself is charged with enforcement, of course, where criminal penalties are
prescribed. Even in the absence of express language making a violation
of the statute a criminal offense, it has been held that action in conflict
therewith may nevertheless be punished as a misdemeanor.31
The right of a union to bring action is subject to considerable uncer-
tainty. A union of municipal employees tried it in Water Works Local
No. 654 v. City of Miami,32 instituting an action for a declaratory judg-
ment to determine whether the city might discriminate against employees
because of union membership. The Supreme Court of Florida held that
the right under the constitutional amendment was personal, and the in-
fringement thereof could not be raised by the union. A similar result was
reached where the union sought to enjoin a private employer from dis-
charging employees because of union membership.3 3 On the other hand
in Leiter Mfg. Co. v. Ladies Garment Workers,3 4 it was held that a union
could obtain a mandatory injunction requiring an employer to reinstate
workers discharged in violation of the Texas statute.
The state was held to have sufficient interest to obtain an injunction
where one of its projects was allegedly threatened by negotiations for a
union security provision between its contractors and the union, in viola-
tion of the Virginia law.3 5
Individual workmen, for whom the laws were ostensibly designed,
have occasionally pursued the remedies made available thereunder. Thus
where a publisher, in order to obtain a contract to print a labor union
journal, agreed to a union shop provision and discharged one worker for
his failure to join, the worker recovered damages from the employer for
the period of his unemployment, after he joined the union and was re-
State v. Bishop, 228 N.C. 371, 45 S.E. 2d 858 (1947), wherein the court reasoned
that an offender may be punished in such a case since the statute is concerned with
public policy and is aimed at practices considered detrimental to the public welfare;
State v. Whitaker, 228 N.C. 352, 45 S.E. 2d 860 (1947). See, also, Local 519 v.
Robertson, 40 S. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950); Local 324 v. Upshur-Rural Electric Co-op
Corp., 261 S.W. 2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
2 157 Fla. 445, 26 S. 2d 194 (1946).
'Miami Laundry Co. v. Local 935, 41 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1949).
269 S.W. 2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
Commonwealth v. Plumbing Journeyman, 32 L.R.R.M. 2610 (Richmond Ct.
1953).
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employed 38 In another case, the workers obtained an order of reinstate-
ment after being discharged as a result of the operation of a maintenance
of membership clause in a collective bargaining agreement,0T
Procedural and factual difficulties are likely to be encountered, how-
ever. For instance, according to the Georgia Supreme Court a mandatory
injunction under general equity powers was not the proper remedy where
the employees were discharged for being union members.38 The Texas
Court of Civil Appeals held that an injunction should not issue where the
worker was discharged for activities not necessarily inherent in union
membership, and thus failed to sustain his burden of showing that such
membership was the procuring cause of the employer's action3 9
Rarely has the individual worker's action been against the union. In
Dukes v. Local 437,40 however, the plaintiff alleged that the union mali-
ciously procured his discharge by (1) falsely telling the employer that he
had been expelled from the union, and (2) threatening to strike. The
court held that the Tennessee statute was directed against the employer
and had no application to the conduct of a union in procuring the dis-
charge.4 1 Some statutes contain an express reference to an association
acting in concert with the employer and in two of these states damages
have been recovered from the union 4 2
'Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 S.E. 2d 872 (1949). Compare, however,
Facker v. Brotherhood of Painters, 26 Labor Cases 86, 867 (Tenn. C. App. 1954),
wherein a contract between a general contractor and a sub-contractor providing that all
painting was to be done by union men was held not to be prohibited by the terms of
the Tennessee law even though the use of union men would of necessity exclude the
use of non-union men.
' Grimes v. Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock & Repair Co., 20 LYR-M. 2464 (Cir. Ct.,
Fla. 1947); aff. 20 L.ILR.M. 2502.
' Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541, 67 S.E. 2d 767 (1941).
t'Local 324 v. Upshur-Rural Electric Co-Operative Corp., 261 S.W. 2d 484 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953). The employee had been a supervisor and was soliciting new
members for the union on the company's time and premises. The court felt that
such activities went beyond the purview of the reference to discharge for union mem-
bership in the statute. Compare, however, Lunsford v. City of Bryan, 297 S.W. 2d
115 (Tex. 1957), where in plaintiff, a city fireman, headed a group which sought
and obtained a local charter from the firemen's national union. He was fired in
the belief that he was already a member of the new local, although the affiliation
was not completed until later the same day. However, plaintiff had done everything
possible to acquire membership, including the payment of dues, and the court held
that he was entitled to the protection of the Texas statute. Apparently it was not so
clear that the discharge in this instance was due primarily to his organizational ac-
tivities apart from his newly acquired membership. In any event, reinstatement was
ordered.
o 191 Tenn. 495, 235 S.W. 2d 7 (1950).
' The court said that a cause of action existed, but not under the statute.
'
2 Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 SE. 2d 872 (1949), in which the union was
held jointly responsible for the damages suffered under the terms of the Virginia
19573
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APPLICATION TO UNION PICKETING
By far the greatest part of the litigation under these provisions has
involved union picketing. Here, of course, it is the employer who is en-
listing support from the terms of the statute, and quite obviously this
accounts for the enthusiastic support of proposals of this type by many
employer groups. It is undoubtedly in this area that the usefulness of
these provisions ultimately will be determined.
In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,43 the Supreme Court de-
cided that peaceful picketing for an unlawful purpose was not protected
by the constitutional guaranty of free speech. The picketing in that case,
undertaken to discourage the use of non-union peddlers, was enjoined as
a violation of the Missouri anti-trust law. A similar result was reached
even in the absence of criminal sanctions in the pertinent state law, the
Court holding that the violation of public policy expressed in a state
statute was sufficient to support the issuance of a restraining order.44 The
"'right to work" laws came well within this rule, of course, and in Plumb-
ers Local No. 10 v. Graham Bros.,45 the Supreme Court ruled that peace-
ful picketing, the purpose of which was in conflict with the Virginia
statute, might properly be enjoined. Following the rule thus established,
the state courts have uniformly held that peaceful picketing which seeks
to attain an objective prohibited by the "right to work" laws may be en-
joined.46 Once this is found to be the case, the issuance of the injunction
will not be barred by evidence that there was, in addition, a lawful pur-
pose, such as improving wages and working conditions,4 7 publicizing sub-
standard wages in an effort to persuade the employer to raise his wage
standard (or other facts of dispute) ,4 organizing non-union employees,49
or seeking recognition as the bargaining agent.50
statute; Russell v. United Auto Workers, 258 Ala. 615, 64 So. 2d 384 (1956),
where the worker recovered damages of $10,000.00.
"336 U.S. 490 (1949).
"Building Service Employees Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
-"345 U.S. 192 (1953).
"Self v. Taylor, 217 Ark. 953, 235 S.W. 2d 45 (1950); Local 519 v. Robertson,
44 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950); Local 430 v. Ormerod, 61 So. 2d 753 (Fla., 1952);
Texas State Federation of Labor v. Brown & Root, 246 S.W. 2d 1938 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1952); Local 1018 v. Roundtree Corp., 194 Va. 148, 72 S.E. 2d (1952);
Shamrock Dairy v. Teamsters Local 310, 36 LR.R.M. 2748 (Ariz. 1955); Minor v.
Building Trades Council, 75 N.W. 2d 139 (N.D. 1956).
T Local 688 v. Stephenson, 148 Tex. 434, 225 S.W. 2d 958 (1950); Burgess v.
Daniel Plumbing & Gas Co., 285 S.W. 2d 517 (Ark. 1956).
" Hanson v. Operating Engineers Local 406, 79 So. 2d 199 (La. Cir. Ct. App.
1955); Local 802 v. Asimos, 216 Ark. 694, 227 S.W. 2d 154 (1950); Self v.
Wisener, 37 L.R.R.M. 2741 (Ark. 1946).
"'Thurman v. Shearin, 37 L.R.R.M. 2579 (Tenn. 1956).
o Gallispie Const. Co. v. International Hod Carriers, 32 L.R.R.M. 2383 (Fla. Cit.
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The rule of unlawful purpose under the state "right to work" laws
may be applied in any case in which union demands are construed as re-
quiring a closed or union shop. Efforts to enforce any such demand, by
picketing or otherwise, have been enjoined on numerous occasions. 51
Preferential hiring arrangements are equally taboo thereunder.52 But this
interpretation does not extend to the point of interfering with the filling
of a work order by the state employment service, where the employer has
requested the referral of union members only.58
Ct. 1953), cert. denied 71 So. 2d 921 (1955); Sax Enterprises, Inc. v. Local 255, 80
So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1955).
'
1Local 234 v. Henley & Beckwith, 66 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1953), involving a pro-
vision that union members would work only for employers who were parties to the
contract and that the employers would employ only journeymen who were union
members in good standing; Machinists Local 924 v. Goff McNair Motor Co., 224
Ark. 30, 264 S.W. 2d 48 (1954), involving a provision that "the refusal of any or
all employees who are members of the union to work with an employee who is not
a member of the union will not be considered a violation of this agreement'; Self v.
Taylor, 217 Ark. 953, 235 S.W. 2d 45 (1950), in which the provision sought
would allow the union to cancel the agreement at any time on 60 days' notice, the
court concluding, upon the evidence, that such a clause would be invoked if any non-
union men were employed; Local 519 v. Robertson, 44 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950);
Local 688 v. Stephenson, 148 Tex. 434, 225 S.W. 2d 958 (1950); Local 802 v.
Asimos, 216 Ark. 694, 227 S.W. 2d 154 (1950); Texas State Federation of Labor v.
Brown & Root, 246 S.W. 2d 1938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Minor v. Building
Trades Council, 75 N.W. 2d 139 (N. Dak. 1956); Burgess v. Daniel Plumbing &
Gas Co., Inc., 285 S.W. 2d 517 (Ark. 1956); Powers v. Courson, 96 S.E. 2d 577, 39
L.R.R.M. 2410 (Ga. 1957); Olen Department Stores v. Retail Clerks, 39 L.R.R.M.
2112 (Miss. Ch. 1956); Local 38 v. Zachry Co., 276 S.W. 2d. 876 (Texas Civ.
App. 1955); Gulf Shipside Storage Co. v. Moore, 71 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 1955);
Treasure, Inc. v. Local 133, 72 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1954).
' Building Trades Council v. Bonita, 280 P. 2d 295 (Nev. 1955), involving a
provision that the union was to be given 48 hours to supply craftsmen required by
the employer before the latter could recruit non-union workmen - the court reas-
oned that so long as the union could meet this condition, the opportunity of non-
union workers would be limited contrary to the intent of the statute; Local 175 v.
Walker, 236 S.W. 2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), in which the result was not
affected by a saving clause which specified that any provision in the contract which
was in violation of a valid state law was to be ineffective; although the picketing
was undertaken to bring about the execution of the contract as a whole; Common-
wealth of Virginia v. Local 10, 32 L.R.R.M. 2610 (Richmond Ct. 1953), in which
the disputed provision would have required the employer to "employ only journey-
men and apprentices who are in good standing in the local union unless the local
union fails to supply an adequate number on request." Compare, however, Ketcher
v. Sheet Metal Workers, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1953), in which the Federal
District Court ruled that a provision requiring the union to furnish, on request,
duly qualified journeymen and apprentices in sufficient numbers as may be neces-
sary to properly execute work contracted for, did not create a dosed or union shop;
and further held that a saving clause like the one in the Walker case, supra, was
effective to avoid a conflict with state law. This was an action for alleged con-
spiracy to induce the breach of a collective bargaining agreement, and against a
defense claim that the contract was illegal as providing for a dosed shop, the sav-
ing clause was considered sufficient basis to dispose of a motion to dismiss.
' Ops, Att'y. Gen. (Nev.), 4 CCH LAB. L. REP., 9 41,025 (Nev., 1952).
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The extent to which these "right to work" provisions may be utilized
is illustrated in a case involving two union meat cutters. Being required
to work twelve hours for six days a week and five hours on Sunday, the
two men appealed to their union for assistance in obtaining better hours
and working conditions. The union sought to obtain a contract making
it the sole bargaining agent for the meat department, in which the two
meat cutters were the only employees. The employer refused to negoti-
ate and when the meat cutters struck and picketed the store, the employer
hired non-union butchers. The picketing was thereafter enjoined at the
employer's request on the basis that the union demand would amount to
an abridgement of the rights of the non-union butchers within the lan-
guage of the Louisiana law.54
In a recent Tennessee decision, peaceful picketing of a non-union
barber shop to force higher prices conforming with union standards was
enjoined partly on the basis of the "right to work" statute.55
Despite the scope of these decisions, exclusively lawful objectives may
still be established if sufficient care is exercised, and it may be said, albeit
cautiously, that the doctrine of "free speech" as applied to picketing"6 is
not entirely dead even in the states with "right to work" laws. Where
the employer has job openings, picketing in order to persuade him to
hire union men is not unlawful. 57 Nor is picketing in protest of a dis-
charge of employees because of union membership.58 Picketing for the
sole purpose of settling a dispute between the company and some of its
drivers regarding a new system of delivering the company's product, will
not be enjoined.59 It has also been held that the bare fact that a picket
"Piegts v. Meat Cutters Union, 228 La. 131, 81 So. 2d 835, 36 L.R.R.M. 2261
(1955), decided under the Louisiana Law prior to its repeal. The union encount-
ered procedural difficulties when it withdrew its demand to be recognized as sole
bargaining agent for the meat department and substituted a request to be recognized
in negotiations for its members only, thereafter filing an application for rehearing.
The maneuver was not successful.
'Flatt v. Barber's Union, 32 CCH LAB. CAS., 5 70,698 (Tenn., 1957), the court
reasoned that there had been an interference wtih the public's free choice of patron-
age. Other grounds for the decision: the union's action tended to thwart competi-
tion, and sought to destroy the owner's right to conduct a business.
'Initialy announced in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
'Local 1018 v. Roundtree Corp., 194 Va. 148, 72 S.E. 2d 402 (1952). The de-
cision is to be distinguished from Hanson v. Local 406, 79 So. 2d 199 (La. Cir.
Ct. App., 1955), wherein no vacancies existed, and Local 10 v. Graham Bros., 345
U.S. 192 (1953), wherein the employer was in effect requested to agree to a union
shop.
'Hotel and Restaurant Employees v. Cothran & Felton, 59 So. 2d 366 (Fla., 1952).
When the union demanded a closed shop contract, the employer responded by fir-
ing all union members, but the court decided that the subsequent picketing was in
protest of the discharge and not the unlawful demand for a closed shop.
'Shamrock Dairy v. Local 310, 36 L.R.R.M. 2748 (Ariz., 1955).
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line exists will not support an inference that the employer is about to be
coerced into forcing all his non-union employees to join up.60
One writer 6' has proposed that a "bargaining fee" be imposed upon
non-union workers in place of the compulsory union membership re-
quired under the traditional union shop plan. This might work very well
in a state like North Dakota, where the "right to work" provision does
not specifically prohibit the payment of fees or charges of any kind to a
labor union;62 but it would be unlawful in most of the others.63
LOCAL JURISDICTION
If a state declines to take advantage of Section 14 (b) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, can a municipality step forward and enact
a valid "right to work" ordinance of its own? In one recent decision,
the court said "no."64 It was held that the federal provision did not give
state subdivisions the power to act in this area, and that the policy of
the state, allowing both dosed and union shop contracts, had preempted
the field to the exclusion of any inconsistent municipal action. But con-
trary opinion has also been expressed.6 5
FEDERAL JURISDICrION
As might be expected in the field of labor relations, with the federal
Labor Management Relations Act applying to most aspects of the subject,
jurisdictional problems are bound to arise with respect to any employer
engaged in, or whose business affects, interstate commerce. The federal
law is normally paramount in cases of conflict66 but of course the prob-
lem is somewhat different where the law in question specifically carves
out an area within which the states are permitted to legislate. Neverthe-
less, where a direct conflict does arise, it has been held that the federal
law remains supreme.
Thus where a labor union engaged in picketing for the purpose of
coercing an employer to require its employees to become or remain union
' Self v. Wisener, 37 L.R.R.M. 2741 (Ark., 1956).
'Spielmans, Bargaining Fee Versus Union Shop, 10 IND. & LAB. R3L. REv. 609
(1957).
'Ops. Att'y. Gen., 37 L.R.R.M. 363 (1956); accord, Ops. Att'y. Gen. (Nev.), 30
L.R.RW.M 127 (1952).
'Arizona Flame Restaurant, Inc. v. Bartenders' Local 631, 34 L.R.R.M. 2707
(Ariz., 1954); Ops. Att'y. Gen. (N.C.), 4 CCH LAB. L. RuPt., 5 41,025 (1952).
"Stephenson v. Palm Springs, 39 L.R.R.M. 2393 (Calif. Super. Ct., 1957).
" Berke and Brunn, Local Right-to-Work Ordinances: A New Problem in Labor and
Local Law, 9 STAw. L. Rnv. 674 (1957), in which the authors conclude that there
is no federal or state impediment to local ordinances on this subject.
" Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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members, the union's action being in conflict with both the provisions of
the state "right to work" law and the terms of Section 8 (b) (2) of the
Labor Management Relations Act, the court ruled that the matter was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the N. L. R. B. and that the union
action could not be enjoined under the terms of the state law.0 7
Likewise, where a group of employees sued for reinstatement after
allegedly being discharged for becoming union members, the state court
concluded that the employer's action amounted to an unfair labor practice
under Section 8 (a) (3) of the Labor Management Relations Act, as in-
terpreted by the N. L. R. B., and an injunction, therefore, could not be
issued under the "right to work" provision.68
This view has been affirmed in a recent decision by the United States
Supreme Court in Electrical Workers Local 429 v. Farnsworth & Cham-
bers Company,69 which involved picketing of a construction site to pre-
vent a contractor from hiring non-union labor. The picketing had been
enjoined as a violation of the state "right to work" law but the Supreme
Court held that the N. L. R. B. had sole authority, notwithstanding the
state law, since interstate commerce was involved.
However, a suit for damages may be a different matter. The right
to damages is specifically granted in most of the state statutes, whereas
the federal law makes no provision for damages as such, although back
wages may be ordered in a proper case. Substantial damages have been
awarded in at least one state case on the ground that a valid state law is
superseded by a federal statute only where the repugnance or conflict is
so direct and positive that the two acts cannot be reconciled or consistent-
ly stand together.70  In such a case, however, the judgment of the state
court will not be binding on the N. L. R. B.71
'" Gulf Shipside Storage Company v. Moore, 71 So. 2d, 236 (La. App. 1955). The
union had been certified as the bargaining representative under the federal act and
the strike was called when the employer refused to accede to the union's demand to
compel all employees to join. In addition to being an unfair practice under the
federal law, the strike was in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The
employer's contention that the state court had jurisdiction because the NLRB Re-
gional Director refused to issue a complaint, was rejected on the basis that the
proper procedure was an appeal to the NLRB itself.
e'Leiter v. Ladies Garment Workers, 269 S.W. 2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App., 1954).
932 CCH LAB. CAs., 5 70, 724 (1957). See, also NLRB v. White Construction
Company, 32 L.R.R.M. 2198 (Ct. of App., 5th Cir., 1953), holding that a demand
by a union for a union shop provision in a collective bargaining contract, although
contrary to the state "right to work" law, did not relieve the employer of his duty to
bargain with the union since the demand related merely to the kind of contract to
be negotiated.
7 Russell v. United Automobile Workers, 258 Ala. 615, 64 So. 2d, 384 (1956).
The employee recovered damages in the sum of $10,000.
'Ibid. The Court held that the essential elements of res ajudicata were lacking be-
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At least one author is convinced that the situation arising out of laws
banning union security provisions in some states and not in others will
eventually lead to competitive pressures upon employers in the latter
states, which may cause management groups to join with labor groups in
seeking greater unanimity through federal legislation.72
Another area of conflict between state "right to work" provisions and
federal law was created by the amendment to the Railway Labor Act in
1951 specifically authorizing union shop agreements.73  A flurry of liti-
gation resulted, and one of the cases eventually reached the United States
Supreme Court.74
Here again the issue of conflicting jurisdiction was resolved in favor
of the federal enactment. The court ruled that the provision was per-
missive only, since Congress was not compelling carriers and their em-
ployees to enter into union shop agreements, and that no violation of
the First or Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution had been
shown.75 In the words of the Court: "The choice by Congress of the
union shop as a stabilizing force seems to us to be an allowable one."
The only conditions to union membership authorized by the Amendment,
the Court pointed out, were the payment of periodic dues, initiation fees
and assessments. 76 The requirement for financial support of the collective
cause the suit in the state court involved the enforcemnt of a private right, whereas
an NLRB order involves the enforcement of a public right or duty.
'Morgan, Union Security - Federal or State Sphere, 4 LAB. L.. 815, 821 (1953).
- 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, g 11. The exact language of this provision, often referred to
as the "union shop" amendment, is as follows:
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or any other
statute or law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State,
any carrier or carriers as defined in this chapter and a labor organization
or labor organizations duly designated and authorized to represent em-
ployees in accordance with the requirements of this chapter shall be per-
mitted -
(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued em-
ployment, that within sixty days following the beginning of such employ-
ment, or the effective date of such agreements, whichever is the later, all
employees shall become members of the labor organization representing
their craft or class: Provided, That no such agreement shall require such
condition of employment with respect to employees to whom membership
is not available upon the same terms and conditions as are generally
applicable to any other member or with respect to employees to whom
membership was denied or terminated for any reason other than the
failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, intitiation fees, and
assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership."
'351 U.S. 225 (1956).
'51d. at 238.
"Id. at 235. See, also, Sandsberry v. International Association of Machinists, 36
LR.R.M. 2753 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1955). This limitation has led Dean McClain to
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bargaining agency by all who receive .ihe benefits of its work, the Court
concluded, is within the power of Congress under the commerce clause.
This result apparently caused consternation to some,77 but had been fore-
shadowed by an overwhelming majority of the courts which had con-
sidered the issue.7 8
ALTERNATE APPROACHES
Not all states which took advantage of Section 14 (b) of the L.M.RA.
chose to outlaw union security measures entirely. The Labor Relations
Law of Massachusetts, in order to protect the rights of individuals em-
ployed under union security agreements, provides for an appeal to the
Labor Relations Commission in any case of unfair denial of admission to,
or suspension or expulsion from, the union. Other state laws have ap-
proached the problem more obliquely, by making it an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to enter into a union security agreement which fails
to meet prescribed conditions. 9 On behalf of this approach, it may be
said that it -is more restrained and more in keeping with earlier applica-
tions of the right to work.
CONCLUSION
From the standpoint of the individual, the "right to work" provisions,
as a practical matter, do not seem to offer too much. Few cases have
question whether the railway unions got a bargain in the Union Shop Amendment,
in view of the attendant restrictions on the use of union funds. McClain, New
Jurisdictional Concepts: Right to Work - Union Membership, 8 LAB. L.J. 159
(1957).
7 See McClain, The Union Shop Amendment: Compulsory "Preedom" to Join a
Union, 42 A.B.A.J. 723 (1956). Compare, Gilbert, The Right to Work Revisited:
A Reply to Dean Joseph A. McClain, 43 A.B.A.J. 231 (1957).
'8 The constitutionality, as well as the supremacy of the federal amendment, was
upheld in the following decisions: Matter of Florida East Coast Railway, 32 L.R.-
R.M., 2533 (D.C., S.D., Fla., 1953); Moore v. C&O R. Co., 34 L.R.R.M., 2666
(Richmond Ct., Va., 1954); Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Company, 242
N. Car., 650, 89 S.E. 2d 441 (1955); International Association of Machinists v.
Sandsberry, 277 S.W. 2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App., 1954). The Texas Supreme Court
postponed a decision (36 L.R.R.M. 2753, (1955)) until after the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling in the Hanson case and then affirmed. Sandsberry v. International
Association of Machinists, 38 L.R.R.M. 2478 (Tex. Sup. Ct., 1956). The only
decision expressing a contrary view was the one appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Hanson v. Union Pacafic R.R., 160 Neb., 669, 71 N.W. 2d 526 (1955).
7See, MATHEWS, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAw, 484-486 (1953). Pennsyl-
vania, Colorado, Wisconsin, and Hawaii have adopted the latter approach, the con-
ditions being similar to those contained in Section 8 (3) of the original Wagner
Act. Colorado, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Hawaii require certain voting procedures
as a condition precedent to the execution of a valid union security agreement (as
did the Taft-Hartley Act with respect to union shop agreements prior to the 1951
amendment).
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been filed by individual workmen. At least in times when jobs are rela-
tively plentiful, the damages suffered by workmen individually are not
likely to be enough, in the average case, to justify the rigors and expense
incident to litigation in the civil courts.
Under both the Labor Management Relations Act and the Railway
Labor Act, even union shop contracts cannot be used to impose general
control over workers. The compulsion extends only to the payment of
initiation fees and periodic dues.80 This reduces the effect of these pro-
visions pretty much to the elimination of "free riders;" and the avoidance
of such exactions, much as they may have a galling effect on some similar
to that engendered by taxes, is unlikely to be worth the effort to the aver-
age workman.
The elimination of discrimination and other abuses within the unions,
would seem to require a more direct approach than that offered by these
provisions banning all forms of union security. The congressional hear-
ings which have been in progress in recent months may possibly produce
some useful ideas for legislation more appropriate to a solution of this
sort of thing. Something with administrative machinery, quickly and
cheaply available, would appear to fit the need better than resort to the
courts, with their already over-burdened dockets. There are also signs
that the unions themselves have become acutely aware of the dangers in-
herent in such abuses and are taking steps under their own procedures to
meet the challenge.
From the management standpoint, these provisions provide another
offensive weapon against the picket line. The decisions make it dear
that picketing which in any way may be construed as an effort to enforce
some form of "union security" is subject to injunction in those states hav-
ing the ban. In some of the other states, the injunctive process appears
to be almost as readily available without the aid of these provisions, but
there can be little doubt that the specific expression of legislative policy
helps.
There are limitations to this, however. As the unions experience the
added threat from this source, they are less likely to allow any semblance
of compulsory unionism to creep into negotiations. In the Piegts case
8l
the union tried to amend its demand and was prevented from doing so
only by procedural limitations. Furthermore, as some of the more recent
decisions indicate, in the larger industries and places of business, the po-
tential conflict with the federal law presents an additional hazard. Final-
' Radio Officers Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954); Union Starch and
Refining Co. v. N.LR.B., 186 F. 2d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir., 1951); and cases cited
supra, note 78.
m Piegts v. Meat Cutters Union, 228 La. 131, 81 So. 2d 835 (1955).
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ly, as the union movement gains a firmer foothold, which it is likely to
do in all of these states as industry moves in, the advantages of these pro-
visions are likely to be less apparent to the average employer.
If neither the workmen nor the employers choose to make frequent
use of these "right to work" provisions, their usefulness will be virtually
ended. They are not self-executing, and according to at least one current
report they are being observed, even now, more in the breach than in
the obeyance.82 In this writer's opinion, the future of this type of legis-
lation is not likely to be portentous.
' Fortune, Sept. 1957.
